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Endnote: Untoward 
PETER GOODRICH* 
A plethora of readings. Indeed a brace of Readers, two Lecturers - the word 
a base Latinity for Reader - and a name which is but a double 'r' away from 
Booke. The sum of which is a thoroughly literary endeavour, a bookish 
event, a series of textual exhalations. The first question to be asked, 
untoward though it may be, is what have the Readers been reading? The rest 
will follow from the answer to that question. 
The initial answer is that the configuration 'Law and Literature' allows 
for a reading of literary texts. Aside from the innominate marginal scribble 
that Goodrich reads, the gathering of texts analysed, interpreted, and brought 
to law are entirely literary. There is a little hedonism, a touch of reverie, as 
well as an expansive gesture toward accessibility, in the selection of books 
being read. Melanie Williams turns to W.H. Auden and questions the trauma 
that motivates specific, nominate, theories of law. Her concern is with the 
'unconscious trends', the patterns and repetitions that lead from 'September 
1, 1939', a poem which Auden wrote in New York at the outbreak of World 
War II, and September 11, 2001. If there is a motif it is a line that Auden 
changed from 'We must love one another or die' to 'We must love one 
another and die'. 
Melanie Williams conjures a trauma that is perceived as external to law 
but which is in fact internal to legal thought. The poet's concerns with crisis, 
the failure of reason, with love and war can be traced in displaced form in the 
history of jurisprudence. She offers a reading that is against the grain, a 
subtle and untoward interpretation that Adam Gearey picks up in analysing 
the words of Desmond Tutu and of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. He also plays upon a contrary or untoward grain, a legal 
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poetics, an aesthetic jurisdiction, .a yearning for an outside that finds muted 
expression, a whisper internal to law: 'And yet/Through glass and bars/Some 
dream a wild sunset/Waiting stars.' 
The paradox of Truth and Reconciliation was that of a law that was not 
law. Its function was to tell a truth that could never be present. You need in 
some degree to be a poet to understand an unknowable justice or to glimpse a 
truth that is untoward or marked by indirection. Adam Gearey wishes 'to tell 
it slant' . He punctures the normality of legalism with a competing text and 
law, and the prize - if reading can produce a prize - is a poetic confrontation 
as much as it is a confrontation with poetry. In Patrick Hanafin's term, 
offered in the course of a reading of Blanchot, it is an act of insubordination. 
For him, literature rebels against law in a profoundly political manner. 
Literature, as he argues here and elsewhere, is the pharmakon, both poison 
and remedy, source and cure of the malady of law. Literature is here the 
resistance, the residue of failed dreams, the call to arms, the political hope of 
making law anew. In his version, literature is untoward in that it calls away 
from the boredom and stasis of legalism, it seduces and garners a literary 
community that will 'unwrite' and so cure the law. 
If Patrick Hanafin is a little untoward, or locally insubordinate, Piyel 
Haldar provides a trope that offers an epoch and a whole continent of 
salacious indirection. The jurisprudence of travel literature goes wholly 
against the grain. He reads a genre of commentaries upon despotism as the 
oriental mode of law. He portrays a vast myth, a juggernaut of juristic 
fantasms, a radically subversive look at the inside of Western law as it stares 
out at Eastern practices. The imperialistic complacency of what Selden 
dubbed 'dulling custom' and the immemorial practice of common law, is 
juxtaposed to descriptions of the bedevilled aberrations, the monstrosity, the 
luxury and excess, the sheer deadly pleasure, the salacious cruelty of 
despotism. 
Haldar's point is that there is as much desire as there is disapproval in 
the excessively detailed depictions of oriental life. There is as much 
projection as there is objection. To borrow a wordplay of Hanafin's, the 
obsession with harems and sudden death does not so much inscribe as de-
scribe or unwrite the Western law that so enjoys detailing the pleasures of 
the East. Suffice to say that in all of this there is a most untoward thread of 
hedonism, of motive force, of the contrary and cutting. Literature objects 
to law as it is currently written. The literary can play with law, and in the 
longer term literature can come to play the law or at least teach lawyers to 
write differently. 
I cannot make much of that last remark here. This is an endnote, though of 
course it is neither an end nor a note, just something untoward. So I will 
fulfill that indirection by looking finally at the Booke. If the topic is law and 
literature, then there is presumably no reason to exclude the possibility of a 
contribution from a literary scholar or, as it happens here, from Brooker. In 
fact Brooker's contribution is emblematic. In one sense that is because he is 
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assisted by knowing what he is talking about, literature being his discipline, 
his profession, and his institutional love. In another sense he personifies the 
untoward. The lawyers in this volume all engage with literary texts as a way 
of challenging the stylistic, textual, and hedonic limits of law. They argue in 
variable forms that literature represents a fracture, a crisis, a puncture of the 
legal restraint of the text. They use poems, fictions, insubordinate acts, and 
wild writings as a way of getting outside of the norm of legal writing and so 
bringing to consciousness the politics of law's inscription. 
Brooker is wise to all of that, and as a lone literary scholar he holds the 
mirror to the maundering of law. He takes as his text a literary law and 
analyses the judgments handed down by a court of voluntary jurisdiction, the 
invention of Flann O'Brien (or Nolan, or na gCopaleen). His question is: 
what constitutes a positive law of literature? O'Brien's wit and wordplay 
produce a satirical law, a better-written and infinitely less inflated text. It is a 
version of the slanted reading that Adam Gearey sought in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission report, a truth that undoes itself in the very 
moment of its enunciation, a law that recognizes that it is also lawless, a 
written judgment that mimics the legal and yet is literary and far from 
entirely serious. 
The crux of Brooker's essay, his most untoward moment, comes in the 
form of a Menippean instance of satirical play. A defendant confesses to his 
failure to abscond. The grounds are linguistic. Had he not appeared then 'too 
well I knew that my bail would not be confiscated. Neither would it be 
impounded (Here defendant became moved.) Neither would it be declared 
forfeit - or even forfeited. It would not be attached. It would be ... (Here 
defendant broke down and began to weep.) ... My bail would be 
ESTREATED.' Brooker cunningly comments that the term 'estreat' is 
recondite. No question about that. It is positively untoward and definitely in 
need of a little explanation. 
Estreat, we are told in Rastell's Termes de la Ley 'is a figure or 
resemblance, and is commonly used for the copy or true note of an original 
writing, as estreats of amerciaments'. 1 So the es treat ironically concerns the 
truth of a writing that has been misplaced or at least is not available in the 
original. It is a fiction in the sense that the estreat is legally true and yet in 
fact unverifiable. Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium lists the estreat under the 
general title of a writ of moderata misericordia, or moderate mercy, a writ 
that seeks to limit the amount of damages. The estreat, and even Fiann 
O'Brien would be hard pressed to concoct quite such a baroque fantasia of 
juridisms, was used 'where there are many plaintiffs named, and they 
amerced, the clerk hath forgotten, and cannot shew how the usage hath been 
to make the estreats against them ... For it cannot properly be said that a 
man hath mercy shewed and offered unto him ifhe shall pay, or shall be put 
to more charge for the offence of another person, which himself hath not 
J. Rastell, Les Termes de la Ley (1566, 1812 edn.) at 208. 
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done. '2 It is lost in translation, but broadly means that the party estreated is 
legally proven to be the party amerced, or the one who owes the damages. 
O'Brien's defendant might well weep at being estreated. He is being 
named, interpellated by the law. Estreatment, in other words, is the punctum, 
the moment when the law leaves the Booke and interrupts life. In its more 
modem definitions, the estreat is precisely the moment of collection, the 
instance of leaving the chain of records and enforcing the fine. 3 The estreat, 
however, also testifies to the imperfection of the record and the necessity of 
mercy or equity because of the failure of memory, and the infinite regress of 
writing. A record only ever refers to something absent but noted and in a 
similar vein what is written will always refer to other writings, and here to 
absent texts. By the same token, this precariously literary quality of law 
provides the possibility of interruption, whether pathological, hedonistic, 
serious or satirical. 
So here is my hypothesis and envoi: the function of the literary is that of 
estreating the study of law. Literature does not treat law, it estreats law, 
which means that it plays with the law so as to reinforce or subvert or amend 
or destroy as occasion warrants. Literature moves beyond the law, it makes a 
fictional, and so, imperfect copy and then indicates or alludes to the fact that 
copies are all that we have. The estreat is a reference to the necessary 
disjunction between record and recollection, and the estreatment of law by 
literature means travelling beyond the record, taking law outside itself, so as 
to go back in. In the jargon of Hollywood you need a treatment to pitch a 
movie. The treatment gives you the basic image of the movie: let's say 
Atlantis filmed in the Arctic to which the studio types would say 'no way, 
there would be white out'. The estreatment is a similar accounting of the 
image of a law: let's say the Irish Constitution, and O'Brien, the head of 
fiction, calls it 'desperate and dark of hue' or simply terribly written. If that 
is the case, if it is poorly inscribed, then tear it up, whether text or law or 
constitution and write it anew. 
2 A. Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (1514, 1793 edn.) at 75-6. 
3 As, for example, Black's Law Dictionary (1999, 7th edn.) at 572. 
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